

A. 3 ページから始まる英文は、Richard Overby による *Why War* (2024) に基づいている。これを読んで以下の設問に答えなさい。

1. 下線部 (1) を日本語に訳しなさい。

2. 空欄 (2) に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(A) eluded (B) encouraged (C) enlightened (D) excluded

3. 空欄 (3) に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(ア) Additionally (イ) Consequently

(ウ) However (エ) Otherwise

4. 下線部 (4) が意味するところを、斜体 (イタリック) の語の含意を踏まえて60字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

5. 空欄 (5) に入るもっとも適切な語を下から選び、記号で答えなさい。

(a) agenda (b) history (c) intellect (d) race

6. 下線部 (6) を日本語に訳しなさい。

7. 筆者が下線部 (7) のように主張するのはなぜか。本文の議論を踏まえて100字以上120字以内の日本語で説明しなさい。

B. Respond in English to the following question:

*What do you see as the greatest threat to peace in the modern world? In response to this threat, how can humans create a more peaceful world?*

You are not required to use Overby's text in your response though you may do so. Your response will be evaluated on clarity of content as well as vocabulary and grammatical ability. Do not exceed the space provided for this question on the answer sheet.

Theories abound on the causes of war. This reality has tempted the view that warfare cannot be satisfactorily explained because <sup>(1)</sup> the many theories produce a messy cocktail of ideas rather than the single, coherent answer that Einstein hoped to get from Freud. There is certainly no consensus among those from all the major human sciences who have tried to explain the cause of war over the past century. The obvious conclusion is that there is no single or straightforward cause to explain the persistence of warfare throughout the human past: the effort to construct a monocausal explanation for war is futile. That does not mean warfare cannot be explained, simply that there are multiple explanations, dependent on time and place, just as collective violence defined as warfare has varied widely through time, from lethal early skirmishes and ambushes in the Paleolithic to the threat of thermonuclear obliteration in the present century.

The absence of consensus is clear in the attempt by scholars across the disciplines to demonstrate that warfare is an evolutionary aberration, largely absent for pre-state humans and in the historic period no more than an interruption of peace. Such approaches are driven by the need to prove that peace is 'normal', not war. \*Margaret Mead's assertion that war is a cultural invention that can be 'uninvented' if humans will it enough is reflected in the pacifist argument that over the past hundred years or so, institutions and norms have been developed to make war less acceptable or likely, even in an age that witnessed the two largest and costliest wars in world history. This is an argument that can be taken to extremes. The political scientist \*Michael Mousseau has suggested that the evolution over five centuries of a world of market-oriented states committed to liberal market norms and values is 'likely to culminate in permanent world peace' by reducing to zero the propensity for war. Few of those who argue for peace as the normal element in human evolution would go so far. The anthropologist \*Douglas Fry, the leading advocate of the concept of the (relatively) peaceful human past, has echoed Mead in arguing that 'war, like slavery before it, *can* be abolished.' He has advocated the further development of legal and institutional governance of international affairs to control conflict before it escalates: 'We are faced with the challenge of bringing the sheriff and the judge to the global \*Wild West.' This is a challenge that has ( 2 ) humankind so far. The problem with many of the arguments for peace as the human destination lies in the search for the causes of war. The assumption that properly understanding why warfare occurs will make it possible to eliminate it, like

finding the final cure for all cancers, is open to the obvious objection that warfare is too diverse and historically widespread to be cured by any single prevailing remedy or remedies. Even the sheriff and the judge had to tame the Wild West at the point of a gun.

War, as \*Kenneth Waltz claimed, is normal, for historians no more than for students of the other human sciences. 'Normal' in the sense that it is not an aberration, but an integral part of the long human story. Moreover, whatever the circumstances that dictate an act of collective violence, small or large, warfare has been practised in every region of the world and through manifold changes in social and political organization, suggesting that there are fundamental explanations for the cause of war in general. ( 3 ), human communities would have chosen to behave differently. Human beings, principally the males, are the only animal species that over long evolutionary time have killed their own kind in large numbers, often inflicting violence with calculated cruelty, irrespective of sex or age. This is true for human beings thousands of years ago and is true in the savage conflicts that have already marked the first quarter of the twenty-first century. For the argument that men, modern men in particular, have an aversion to killing others, there is the counterevidence that in the Second World War, it was possible to take 100 million men, a cross section of their societies, and, after often brief spells of training, to get them to bomb, shell, shoot, and bayonet millions of their fellow species.

There are several levels of explanation for the exceptional violence displayed by humans. The first level comprises the general causes, internal and external, that have affected human evolution. That humans have adapted biologically to engage in violence when necessary to preserve the gene pool and secure reproductive success now seems likely to be the first building block in explaining intraspecific conflict. <sup>(4)</sup>Warfare is on this reading not *in* our genes but *for* our genes. Because humans act consciously rather than from raw instinct, the biological imperative to fight when needed was reinforced by an evolved psychology that divided the human world into 'them' and 'us', justifying intraspecific killing while creating a psychological predisposition to accept collective violence as a normative social responsibility, particularly for men. As archaic human communities developed language and symbolic culture, so it was possible to invest warfare with more meaning, as a manifestation of cosmological belief or of cultures in which warfare was viewed as both necessary and valued. The coevolution of culture and biology

for most of the long human past created conditions within which nature and nurture together, not either one or the other, reinforced the resort to violence when regarded as necessary or advantageous.

The second level of explanation moves from the general context for warfare to specific motives to act. Human beings acted and act within the broad parameters already outlined, but they do so from conscious motives. These can be broadly defined under the four headings: resources, belief, power, and security. These are not mutually exclusive, because it is likely, for example, that pursuit of power will also enhance security, just as it is likely to bring additional resources. A war for belief may also bring resource advantages, as it did briefly for the crusaders, and at the same time increase the security of the faith. In most cases, however, it is possible with wars ancient and modern to isolate the principal motive behind any given conflict. It is also possible for a single ambitious individual, an Alexander or a Napoleon, to supply the driving force for warfare — a unique and unpredictable cause difficult to integrate with the broader parameters of warfare or with the common range of motives. These motives are, like the level of general factors, universal rather than historically contingent. The search for security, the pursuit of power, the greed for others' resources, wars for faith or ideology are built into the human condition. These ends can of course be found by means other than warfare, but when they are obstructed or intractable or culturally dictated, there remains the option of violence to secure them, whether nomads raiding the frontiers of imperial China or the Russian army in Ukraine today.

Warfare viewed through the two levels of explanation, the general context framing the specific motives, can be understood as a mixture of imperatives that have remained remarkably constant over human history, though the mix can vary from case to case. The complex ways in which warfare has been shaped by natural imperatives and human agency operating in tandem means abandoning the idea that explaining warfare can be simple. There remains what \*Azar Gat has called 'the causal array that leads to war'. This still leaves work for the historian, as every war will have its own narrative and actors, but at the level of a general answer to the question 'Why war?', the causal nexus has a universal applicability.

All discussion of the causes of war begs the question of whether war is likely to remain on the human ( 5 ). There has been much discussion of the obsolescence of war or of war in decline. The idea that there will never

again be war between great powers has been common to strategic argument since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1990–91, though much the same argument existed before 1914 and the onset of the second ‘Thirty Years’ War’. Predictions of the future of warfare suffer from all the obvious drawbacks of prediction, not least because the uncertainty generated by the rise of China and American insecurity has prompted a wave of \*Cassandras warning of impending conflict. One statistical project on predicting warfare by region and country up to the year 2050, published in 2013, demonstrated that conflict within states rather than between them was set to decline by around 50 percent by mid-century. Tanzania was predicted very precisely to have a 21 percent probability of conflict in 2030, and so on. As the measures used to infer the decline of conflict are levels of infant mortality and advances in education, it might well be better to rely on \*Nostradamus. A more recent study has suggested that the element of surprise will be a critical factor in great-power war in the current century, which is certainly more convincing historically even if it poses the conundrum of trying to predict the unpredictable.

Aside from the divided opinion of whether a power clash between China and the United States is inevitable, there are other forms of ‘future warfare’ that have attracted a good deal of popular attention. The first is cyberwar, the deliberate and aggressive effort to disrupt the computer network operations of a rival or enemy. This has so far been attempted only by Russia, against Estonia in 2007, Georgia in 2008, and Ukraine in 2022–23. Cyberattacks can be directed at military and civilian networks, undermining daily life as well as military communications and capability. So seriously has the US government taken the threat that President Barack Obama in 2009 declared the digital infrastructure to be a ‘strategic national asset’. A year later, the US Strategic Command created \*USCYBERCOM as a subdivision charged with developing computer network defences and attacks. The American \*Stuxnet computer worm was used since then to damage Iran’s nuclear programme. Cyberwar, it is evident, has indirect effects as no one will be killed by it, but it is expected that over the coming century it will become an increasingly significant part of any major state’s warfare armoury. The same might be said of the threat of war in space. General agreement since the 1970s that space ought to be a weaponless sanctuary has been progressively challenged as more states put satellites into orbit and develop the technology capable of knocking out or blinding a rival satellite, as China has shown with

antisatellite exercises over the past decade. Because satellite communication has a vital military dimension, there has been growing concern about how to defend against war fighting in space. In 2017, the United States set up US Space Command and the US Space Force with a brief like the one for the cyberwar command, to develop antisatellite capability and forms of satellite defense.

Warfare will evidently change during the coming century but between whom and from what motives is unpredictable. The wars so far this century confirm the causal nexus. The idea that war is programmed to die out is impossible to reconcile with the crop of conflicts since 2000 or with the anticipated ecological crisis, resource stress, and religious conflict in the coming decades that could result in the kinds of war for which there is a long historical pedigree. <sup>(6)</sup> There are scant grounds for thinking that a warless world is about to emerge from the current or future international order. The causes of war have been persistent for millennia. The major powers are posturing for potential conflict over Russian aggression in Ukraine; no one observing the heavily armed adversaries on the ground, or the proxy war waged by the West, or the regular threats of nuclear escalation could be persuaded that warfare in all its many iterations will become a thing of the past. <sup>(7)</sup> If war has a very long human history, it also has a future.

\*Margaret Mead (1901–78): An American cultural anthropologist.

\*Michael Mousseau (1964–): An American political scientist.

\*Douglas Fry (1953–): An American anthropologist.

\*Wild West: Originally refers to the western frontier of the United States in the nineteenth century, where ‘sheriffs’ served as the guardians of peace of local societies like police officers today.

\*Kenneth Waltz (1924–2013): An American political scientist.

\*Azar Gat (1959–): An Israeli researcher of war, nationalism, and ideology.

\*Cassandra: A mythical princess of Troy, who was given the gift of prophecy, but her words were made by a god to be disbelieved.

\*Nostradamus: A 16th-century French astrologer and physician, whose works have been interpreted as mysterious ‘prophecy’.

\*USCYBERCOM: The United States Cyber Command is one of the eleven unified combatant commands of the United States Department of Defense.

\*Stuxnet: A malicious computer worm first uncovered in 2010 and thought to have been in development since at least 2005.